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CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEDENTS IN JAPAN:
A COMMENT ON THE ROLE OF PRECEDENT
SHIGENORI MATSUI
INTRODUCTION
Japan is a civil law country, and the precedent of the Supreme Court is
not binding on either the Supreme Court itself or lower courts. Judges are
supposed to return to the text of the statute for each legal dispute and
apply the rules to specific cases. Judicial decisions are not ―law‖ to be
applied by the courts.1
Despite this assumption, judges have followed the precedent of the
Supreme Court most of the time. The Supreme Court will follow its
precedent in normal situations, and the lower courts will usually follow the
precedent of the Supreme Court as well. Thus, although the precedents are
not legally binding, they have a de facto binding power.2
In this Comment, I will focus on constitutional law precedents to
illustrate the Supreme Court of Japan’s approach toward its own
precedent. 3 As Professor Itoh pointed out in his Article, the theory of
precedent may be a convenient measure to justify or rationalize the
outcome the Supreme Court has already reached.4 Yet, precedent plays a
very important role in constitutional adjudication, constraining the
decision making of the Supreme Court.

Professor of Law, University of British Columbia. L.L.B (1978), Kyoto University; L.L.M.
(1980), Kyoto University; J.S.D. (1986), Stanford Law School; L.L.D. (2000) Kyoto University.
1. NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE , KENPŌ [C ONSTITUTION ] 374 (4th ed. 2007); TOSHIHIKO NONAKA,
M UTSUO N AKAMURA, KAZUYUKI T AKAHASHI & KATSUTOSHI T AKAMI, KENPŌ I
[C ONSTITUTION I] 13 (4th ed. 1996); HIDEKI S HIBUTANI, KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION ] 666 (2007);
M IYOKO T SUJIMURA, KENPŌ [C ONSTITUTION ] 17 (3d ed. 2008); NORIHO URABE , KENPŌGAKU
KYOUSHITU [S TUDIES ON THE C ONSTITUTION ] 327–28 (rev. ed. 2000).
2. Some commentators argue that, given the ambiguity of the de facto binding effect, it is better
to acknowledge that precedents are legally binding in Japan. KOUJI S ATŌ , KENPŌ [C ONSTITUTION ]
27 (3d ed. 1995); HIDENORI TOMATSU , KENPŌ SOSHŌ [C ONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION ] 398–401
(2d ed. 2008). However, many disagree, especially with respect to the binding effect upon lower
courts, since the Japanese Supreme Court has the power to nominate lower court judges for
reappointment and practically controls them. YOUICHI H IGUCHI, KENPŌ I [C ONSTITUTION I] 510
(1998).
3. According to the Saibanshohō [Judiciary Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 10, only the grand
bench can make a judgment inconsistent with the previous judgment of the Supreme Court in its
―interpretation and application of the Constitution‖ and other statutes. As a result, the petty bench
cannot overturn the precedent of the Supreme Court.
4. Hiroshi Itoh, The Role of Precedent at Japan’s Supreme Court, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1631
(2011).
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A. Precedents of the Supreme Court
The precedents of the Supreme Court are tremendous authority for later
Supreme Court inquiries. After the Supreme Court established the
―purpose and effect test‖ to determine the permissibility of government
involvement with Shinto under the separation of state and religion
principle in the Tsu City Ground-breaking Ceremony Case,5 for instance,
the Supreme Court has consistently applied this purpose and effect test in
subsequent cases.
Article 20 of the Japanese Constitution provides for the principle of
separation of state and religion in addition to protecting freedom of
religion. At issue in the Tsu City Ground-breaking Ceremony Case was
the constitutionality of the city’s hosting and using public funds for a
ground-breaking ceremony by a Shinto priest in accordance with the
Shinto ceremony style. The Supreme Court held that government
involvement with religion that has either a purpose of advancing the
religion or an effect of promoting the religion is precluded by the
Constitution6 It then concluded that hosting the ground-breaking ceremony
and paying public money was not a constitutional violation because the
ground-breaking ceremony was commonly practiced before construction.7
The ceremony had neither the purpose nor effect of promoting Shinto.8
The Supreme Court later cited the Tsu City Ground-breaking
Ceremony Case precedent and applied the purpose and effect test in
subsequent cases. In one case, the Supreme Court held that the
participation of Self-Defense Force (SDF) officers in the joint
enshrinement of a deceased SDF officer at the Shinto shrine, despite
opposition from the deceased’s wife, did not have the purpose or effect of
promoting or advancing Shinto.9 In another case, the Supreme Court held
that using public funds to move a memorial stone enshrining deceased
soldiers, providing property for free use, and allowing the participation of
school officials in the annual memorial service held at the memorial stone
did not have the purpose or effect of promoting or advancing Shinto.10 The
5. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 13, 1977, Sho 46 (gyo-tsu) no. 69, 31 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO
533 (grand bench).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 1, 1988, Sho 57 (0) no. 902, 42 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI
HANREISHŪ [M INSHŪ ] 277 (grand bench).
10. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 16, 1993, Sho 62 (gyo-tsu) no. 148, 47 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO
MINJI HANREISHŪ [M INSHŪ ] 1687 (3d petty bench).

MINJI HANREISHŪ [M INSHŪ ]
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Supreme Court also held that providing a public subsidy to the local
chapter of War Bereaved Association, an association of families of
deceased soldiers that hosted the annual memorial service at the memorial
stone, did not have the purpose or effect of advancing or promoting
Shinto.11 However, it was only in the Ehime Tamagushi Case12 that the
Supreme Court applied the purpose and effect test and concluded that the
mandate of separation of state and religion had been violated. In that case,
the Supreme Court found that the public spending for tamagushi—a twig
of the sakaki tree wrapped with folded white paper, which is a religious
offering to the Shinto shrine—had a deeper involvement with Shinto such
that it had the effect of promoting Shinto by providing the impression that
the Shinto shrine is special.13
These cases vividly show the impact of Supreme Court precedent upon
later Supreme Court decisions. Of the four seperation of state and religion
cases following the Tsu City Ground-breaking Ceremony Case examined
above, all were decided using its precedential purpose and effect test, and
three of the four resulted in the same outcome. Clearly, the Supreme Court
is likely to follow its precedent if any precedent can be found.
B. Blindly Following the Precedents?
However, since the principle of stare decisis is not accepted in Japan,
judges tend to make no sharp distinction between ratio decidendi and
obiter dicta. Moreover, judges tend to simply follow the precedent without
inquiring into the specific fact situations that led to the creation of the
precedent. In other words, judges have a tendency to ignore the factual
differences between the case that created the precedent and the case before
them.
An example is the Gifu Prefecture Youth Ordinance Case.14 At issue
was the constitutionality of the Gifu Prefecture Youth Protection
11. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 21, 1999, Hei 7 (gyo-tsu) no. 122, 1696 HANREI JIHŌ
[HANJI] 96 (1st petty bench).
12. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 1997, Hei 4 (gyo-tsu) no. 56, 51 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI
HANREISHŪ [M INSHŪ ] 1673 (grand bench).
13. Id. Later, in the Sorachibuto Shrine Case, the Supreme Court held that providing public land
for free use by the Shinto Shrine was a violation of the separation of state and religion, but it applied
the totality of the circumstances test instead of the purpose and effect test. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.]
Jan. 20, 2010, Hei 19 (gyo-tsu) no. 260, 64 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [M INSHŪ ] 1 (grand
bench). The Supreme Court did not explain why it did not apply the purpose and effect test and thus
raised some speculation as to the future of the purpose and effect test.
14. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 19, 1989, Sho 62 (A) no. 1462, 43 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ ] 785 (3d petty bench).
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Ordinance, which banned the use of vending machines to sell books and
magazines found to be harmful for minors. The ordinance listed books and
magazines that were either sexually explicit or extremely brutal and were
harmful for the healthy development of minors, and it prohibited their
distribution if they were found to be harmful by the governor or if they fell
into a prohibited category. The defendant company was prosecuted for
violating this ordinance and challenged its conviction as an infringement
of the freedom of expression protected in Article 21, paragraph 1 of the
Constitution, and as a violation of the prohibition on censorship in Article
21, paragraph 2. The Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s challenge
with the following holding:
Among the arguments made by respondent counsel Manabu
Yamaguchi and counsel Kouji Iguchi, with respect to argument on
appeal on violation of article 21, paragraph 1 of the Constitution,
since it is apparent that the ban on selling books harmful to minors
under article 6, paragraph 2, article 6-6, paragraph 1, main text,
article 21, paragraph 5 of the Gifu Prefecture Youth Protection
Ordinance (hereinafter cited as said ordinance) does not violate
article 21, paragraph 1 of the Constitution in light of each of our
grand bench precedents (Supreme Court, March 13, 1957, 11
KEISHŪ 997; Supreme Court, October 15, 1969, 23 KEISHŪ 1239;
Supreme Court, October 23, 1985, 39 KEISHŪ 413), the argument
has no merit. With respect to argument on violation of article 21,
paragraph 2, of the Constitution, since it is apparent that the
designation of books as harmful to minors under the said ordinance
is not a prohibited censorship under that paragraph in light of each
of our grand bench precedents (Supreme Court, December 12, 1984,
38 MINSHŪ 1308; Supreme Court, June 11, 1986, 40 MINSHŪ 872),
the argument has no merit . . . .15
However, among the three cases cited as precedent to reject the argument
that the ban violated Article 21, paragraph 1, the first two were concerned
with the ban on distribution of obscenity under the Criminal Code,16 and
the third was concerned with the criminal punishment for sexual
intercourse with minors under a local youth protection ordinance.17 None

15. Id.
16. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 13, 1957, Sho 28 (A) no. 1713, 11 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ ] 997 (grand bench); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 15, 1969, Sho 39 (A) no.
305, 23 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ ] 1239 (grand bench).
17. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 23, 1985, Sho 57 (A) no. 621, 39 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI
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of these was concerned with the criminal ban on materials found to be
harmful to minors. Two cases were also cited as precedent to reject the
argument that the ban violated Article 21, paragraph 2, but the first was
concerned with the customs regulation banning importation of obscene
materials,18 and the other was concerned with judicial injunctions against
publication of materials found to be defamatory.19 Neither of these was
concerned with the power of the governor to designate certain materials as
harmful to minors and to prohibit their distribution to minors. Nor were
any of the precedents concerned with the criminal punishment of a
defendant who violated the ban on distribution of materials designated by
the governor to be harmful to minors.
The Gifu Prefecture Youth Ordinance Case holding indicates that the
Supreme Court has a tendency to rely upon precedent regardless of
differences in fact situations. In other words, precedent in Japan tends to
be viewed as a general framework, separated from specific fact situations.
Since the precedents are not binding, there is no urgent legal necessity to
distinguish ratio decidendi from obiter dicta. But because of the Japanese
judges’ de facto reliance on precedent, the tendency to rely upon precedent
despite the factual differences might give more authoritativeness to the
precedent.
C. Overruling the Precedents without Explaining Why
The Supreme Court sometimes explicitly overturns precedent. In such
cases, the Supreme Court usually does not explain why overruling
precedent was necessary, except to express the reasons that the Supreme
Court now believes in a different conclusion.
For example, the Supreme Court overturned its precedent in the
Confiscation of the Third Party Property Case 20 by holding that the
defendant could challenge the constitutionality of the government’s
confiscation of property, which the defendant possessed but was owned by
a third party, without affording an opportunity for a hearing with the thirdparty owner. In a previous decision, 21 the Supreme Court held that

HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ ]

413 (grand bench).
18. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 12, 1984, Sho 57 (gyo-tsu) no. 156, 38 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO
MINJI HANREISHŪ [M INSHŪ ] 1308 (grand bench).
19. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 11, 1986, Sho 56 (O) no. 609, 40 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI
HANREISHŪ [M INSHŪ ] 872 (grand bench)
20. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 28, 1962, Sho 30 (A) no. 2961, 16 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ ] 1593 (grand bench).
21. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 19, 1960, Sho 28 (A) no. 3026, 14 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI
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defendants should not be allowed to invoke the infringement of the rights
of a third party to challenge the constitutionality of government action. In
the subsequent case, the Supreme Court emphasized, however, that when
confiscation was imposed upon the defendant, it deprived him of the right
to occupy the property and put him in the position of being held liable for
damages to the third party, thus justifying the defendant’s ability to
challenge the confiscation order. 22 The Supreme Court thus explicitly
overruled its precedent.23 The Supreme Court never explained why it was
justified in overruling the precedent.
The Supreme Court also overturned its precedent in the Parricide
Case24 by holding that the parricide provision of the Criminal Code, which
imposed a heavier penalty against parricide than regular homicide, was
unconstitutional. The Criminal Code imposed a term of imprisonment of
no less than three years and up to life imprisonment or the death penalty
for defendants convicted of regular homicide,25 while imposing only life
imprisonment or the death penalty for defendants convicted of parricide.26
The sentencing judge can choose a specific sentence from these options. If
there were strong mitigating factors, the judge can impose a sentence of
imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, and the judge can
suspend the enforcement of the imprisonment sentence. 27 A defendant
convicted of regular homicide thus may not have to go to jail. But with
respect to a defendant convicted for parricide, the judge cannot choose a
sentence of imprisonment for a term of not more than three years no
matter what mitigating factors may exist. A defendant convicted of
parricide thus must go to jail regardless of mitigating factors. In its
previous decisions, 28 the Supreme Court rejected this constitutional
challenge. Yet, in this case, the majority of the Supreme Court came to
believe that the penalty imposed on parricide was unreasonably heavier
than the penalty imposed on regular homicide, since the penalty would not
allow for a suspension in the enforcement of the sentence regardless of

HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ ]

1574 (grand bench).
22. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 28, 1962, Sho 30 (A) no. 2961, 16 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ ] 1593 (grand bench).
23. Id.
24. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Sho 45 (A) no. 1310, 27 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ ] 265 (grand bench).
25. KEIHŌ [PEN. C.], art. 199 (amended in 2004 to impose death sentence, life imprisonment,
or imprisonment for no less than five years).
26. Id. art. 200 (deleted in 1995).
27. Id. art. 25, para. 1.
28. See, e.g., Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 25, 1950, Sho 25 (A) no. 292, 4 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO
KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ ] 2126 (grand bench).
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whether there were significant mitigating factors. 29 The Supreme Court
thus explicitly overturned its precedent.30
In the Parricide Case, the Supreme Court listed several reasons for
reconsideration of the issue: the earlier case that upheld the provision
indicated a concern that this provision might be too harsh; the Supreme
Court had denied its application when there were mitigating
circumstances; this provision, enacted before the Japanese Constitution,
served the philosophical goal of securing respect for parents by imposing
heavier criminal punishment, a tradition which came to be rejected in
many countries; and this provision was not included in the new draft of the
Criminal Code.31 These are the reasons why the Supreme Court came to
believe it was necessary to give a fresh look at the issue and to come up
with a new constitutional rule.
D. Implicitly Overruling?
Sometimes, the Supreme Court makes a judgment inconsistent with its
precedent, thereby implicitly overturning it. Such was the Tokyo Public
Safety Ordinance Case. 32 Prior to this judgment, the Supreme Court
upheld the Niigata Prefecture Public Safety Ordinance against an
allegation of infringement of the freedom of expression in the Niigata
Prefecture Public Safety Ordinance Case.33 The Supreme Court held that
an advance notification requirement for a public demonstration, as
opposed to a general permit requirement, could be justified and that the
government should be allowed to prohibit a demonstration if there was a
clear and present danger to public safety.34 Yet, in the Tokyo Public Safety
Ordinance Case, the Supreme Court held that the Tokyo Public Safety
Ordinance was constitutional, even though it was a comprehensive
advance permit requirement.35 The Supreme Court held that the advance
permit requirement was not much different than the advance notification
requirement and that the government should be allowed to prohibit the
29. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Sho 45 (A) no. 1310, 27
265 (grand bench).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 20, 1960, Sho 35 (A) no. 112, 14
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ ] 1243 (grand bench).
33. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 24, 1954, Sho 26 (A) no. 3188, 8
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ ] 1866 (grand bench).
34. Id.
35. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 20, 1960, Sho 35 (A) no. 112, 14
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ ] 1243 (grand bench).

SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI

HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ ]

SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI
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demonstration if there was a danger that the public safety might be
disturbed, since a demonstration is always capable of turning into a riot.36
The Supreme Court never mentioned the Niigata Prefecture Public Safety
Ordinance Case, but it was apparent that the Supreme Court implicitly
overturned the precedent. This decision failed to justify the practical
overruling of the precedent.
The Supreme Court sometimes gives a new interpretation to precedent
and, in so doing, implicitly overrules the precedent. The Overseas Voters
Case 37 is a typical case. It was settled in the previous Voting at Home
Case 38 that the public could seek damages against the government if a
statute was found to be unconstitutional. The action of the Diet is a
government action that could trigger governmental liability. 39 The
question was when damages could be recovered. The Voting at Home
Case held that damages would be awarded only when the Diet violated the
unequivocal language of the Constitution, a highly exceptional situation
that is hard to imagine. 40 The Supreme Court then concluded that
abolishing and failing to reinstate a voting system that had allowed
seriously disabled voters to cast votes at home was not a sufficiently
blatant violation of the unequivocal language of the Constitution to permit
a recovery of damages. 41 Lawyers and academics believed that this
holding practically precluded the public from seeking damages against the
government because of the conduct of the Diet.42 In the Overseas Voters
Case, the Diet failed to provide the opportunity for voters living abroad to
vote; these voters did not have local addresses and were totally excluded
from voting before 1998. The 1998 amendment gave them an opportunity
to participate in proportional representation elections, but they were still
excluded from voting in election districts. The Supreme Court held that
the total exclusion of overseas voters from the election before 1998 and
their exclusion from district elections after 1998 were both
unconstitutional.43 Then, the Supreme Court granted a damages award to

36. Id.
37. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 14, 2005, Hei 13 (gyo-tsu) no. 82, 59 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO
MINJI HANREISHŪ [M INSHŪ ] 2087 (grand bench).
38. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 21, 1985, Sho 53 (0) no. 1240, 39 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI
HANREISHŪ [M INSHŪ ] 1512 (1st petty bench).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. ASHIBE , supra note 1, at 369 (criticizing the Supreme Court as practically precluding the
possibility of reviewing the constitutionality of the inaction of the Diet); TOMATSU , supra note 2,
at 156.
43. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 14, 2005, Hei 13 (gyo-tsu) no. 82, 59 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO
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all the plaintiffs, overseas voters, insisting that the damages award should
be granted when the Diet’s conduct is an apparent violation of
constitutional rights or when the Diet fails to pass legislative measures
necessary to secure the exercise of constitutional rights without
justification for a long time where such measures are indispensable.44 The
Supreme Court then added that the thrust of the Voting at Home Case was
not different from this holding. 45 The Supreme Court thereby radically
reinterpreted, and practically overruled, its precedent to expand the scope
of cases where damages may be recovered.
E. Overruling Due to Mere Change in the Composition of the Supreme
Court?
The overruling in the All Forest and Agricultural Public Workers,
Police Office Act Amendment Opposition Case46 is more controversial. In
Japan, all public workers, regardless of the nature of their jobs or their
ranks, are prohibited from striking,47 despite the constitutional guarantee
of the right to strike in Article 28 of the Constitution. There is also
criminal punishment for those who conspire, solicit, advocate, or plan such
an illegal strike. 48 The earlier All Postal Workers, Tokyo Central Post
Office Case49 involved the criminal prosecution of union leaders of postal
workers, who were public corporation workers, for soliciting an illegal
strike. With respect to public corporation workers, the Public Corporation
and State Managed Company Workers Labor Relation Act used to have a
prohibition against strikes,50 but no criminal punishment was imposed on

MINJI HANREISHŪ [M INSHŪ ]

2087 (grand bench).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 25, 1973, Sho 43 (A) no. 2780, 27 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ ] 547 (grand bench).
47. Kokka kōmuinhō [National Public Workers Act], Law No. 120 of 1947, art. 98, para. 2;
Chihō kōmuinhō [Local Public Workers Act], Law No. 261 of 1950, art. 37.
48. Kokka kōmuinhō [National Public Workers Act], Law No. 120 of 1947, art. 110, para. 17;
Chihō kōmuinhō [Local Public Workers Act], Law No. 261 of 1950, art. 61, para. 4.
49. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 26, 1966, Sho 39 (A) no. 296, 20 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ ] 901 (grand bench).
50. Kōkyōkigyōtaitō rōdōkankeihō [Public Corporation and State Managed Company Workers
Labor Relations Act], Law No. 257 of 1948, art. 17. This statute was originally enacted as
Kōkyōkigyōtai rōdōkankeihō [State Managed Company Workers Labor Relations Act] in 1948. In
1986, it was renamed as Kokueikigyō rōdōkankeihō [State Managed Company Workers Labor
Relations Act]. In 2001, it was again renamed as Kokueikigyō oyobi tokutei dokuritsugyoseihōjin no
rōdōkankei nikansuru hōritsu [Act Concerning Labor Relations in State Managed Company and
Specified Independent Administrative Corporation], and in 2003 it became Tokutei
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those who organized a strike. The government thus decided to impose
criminal punishment on those union organizers under the Postal Act,
which prohibited the refusal to perform post service. 51 In that case, the
Supreme Court held that the right to strike could only be deprived after
balancing the protection of the rights of public workers and the necessity
of protecting the public. 52 The Supreme Court also held that criminal
penalties should be minimized, allowing for punishment of the union
leaders who solicited the illegal strike only when their strike was not for a
legitimate purpose, when the strike was accompanied with violence, or
when the strike was continued for an improperly long time.53 This holding
was praised for its sensitive attitude toward the rights of public workers.54
The Supreme Court applied this holding to local public workers55 and then
to national public workers56 as well.
Yet, seven years later, in the All Agricultural and Forest Workers,
Police Office Act Amendment Opposition Case, the Supreme Court
radically changed its attitude. In this case, the leaders of All Agricultural
and Forest Workers, a union of the national public workers, were
prosecuted for soliciting an illegal strike under the National Public
Workers Act. The Supreme Court held that the strike by the public
workers was inconsistent with the status and public nature of their jobs
and might seriously impact the public by suspending public services.57 The
Supreme Court also held that the strike by the public workers undermined
the principle of representative government since it could force the
legislature to address the employment relationship under pressure.58 The
Supreme Court rejected the limiting construction on the criminal
punishment for the solicitation of illegal strikes and concluded that union
leaders could be punished. 59 The Supreme Court thus overturned the
precedent that followed the All Postal Workers, Tokyo Central Post Office

dokuritsugyoseihōjinno no rōdōkankei nikansuru hōritsu [Act on Labor Relationship of Specified
Independent Administrative Corporation].
51. Yūbinhō [Postal Act], Law No. 165 of 1947, art. 79, para. 1.
52. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 26, 1966, Sho 39 (A) no. 296, 20 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ ] 901 (grand bench)
53. Id.
54. ASHIBE , supra note 1, at 263; TSUJIMURA, supra note 1, at 320.
55. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 1969, Sho 41 (A) no. 401, 23 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ ] 305 (grand bench).
56. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 1969, Sho 41 (A) no. 1129, 23 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ ] 685 (grand bench).
57. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 25, 1973 Sho 43 (A) no. 2780, 27 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ ] 547 (grand bench).
58. Id.
59. Id.

2011]

CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEDENTS IN JAPAN

1679

Case and gave a limiting construction to the National Public Workers
Act,60 while practically overturning the All Postal Workers, Tokyo Central
Post Office Case decision. Later, the Supreme Court applied its new ruling
to local public workers 61 and then to public corporation workers, 62
explicitly overturning the All Postal Workers, Tokyo Central Post Office
Case.
Since the purpose of the strike in the All Agricultural and Forest
Workers, Police Office Act Amendment Opposition Case was to oppose an
amendment to the Police Office Act, which is not related to employee
welfare, criminally punishing the leaders was not precluded under the
framework of the All Postal Workers, Tokyo Central Post Office Case.
Yet, the fact that the Supreme Court went on to both reexamine the whole
framework and to implicitly overturn the holding suggested the adoption
of a totally different constitutional jurisprudence by the new majority.
Minority Justices in the All Agricultural and Forest Workers, Police Office
Act Amendment Opposition Case strongly criticized the practical
overruling of the All Postal Workers, Tokyo Central Post Office Case as
unnecessary and pointed out that the majority opinion was nothing but the
minority position rejected by the Supreme Court in that decision. This
strongly suggests that the overruling was a result of a mere change in the
composition of the Supreme Court.63 It is apparent that this overruling was
the result of strong criticism from conservative politicians in the ruling
party in the Diet and the change in the composition of the Supreme Court
that resulted from these criticisms. Academic commentators generally
sided with the minority and criticized the Supreme Court for its overruling
of the All Postal Workers, Tokyo Central Post Office Case.64
60. Id., overruling Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 1969, Sho 41 (A) no. 401, 23 SAIKŌ
SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ ] 305 (grand bench).
61. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 21, 1976, Sho 44 (A) no. 1275, 30 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ ] 1178 (grand bench).
62. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 4, 1977, Sho 44 (A) no. 2571, 31 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ ] 182 (grand bench).
63. Id. (Jiro Tanaka, J., opinion).
64. TOMATSU , supra note 2, at 371, 372; T SUJIMURA, supra note 1, at 322.
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CONCLUSION
As Professor Itoh noted in his Article, respect for precedent might be
viewed as ―another means by which the judiciary attempts to justify and
rationalize conclusions prestructured by its deeply ingrained attitudes.‖65
The Supreme Court follows its precedent when it is satisfied with it, but
the Supreme Court is willing to modify or overturn precedent when it
finds itself dissatisfied with it. There is no feeling among Justices that they
have to follow precedent, even when they are somewhat unhappy with it,
so long as there is no compelling reason for changing it. Yet, precedent
does play a very significant role in constitutional adjudication even though
it is not legally binding. When the Supreme Court overrules its precedent,
it at least has to persuasively explain why it has overturned its precedent.
Otherwise, the Supreme Court might face strong criticism from dissenters
and academic commentators. To that extent, precedents constrain the
Supreme Court.66

65. Itoh, supra note 4, at1666. Political scientists generally point out that precedent does not have
a strong impact upon the outcome of a decision. See generally Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth,
The Influence of Stare Decisis on the Votes of United States Supreme Court Justices, 40 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 971 (1996). Relying upon these works, Frederick Schauer argues that precedent rarely matters in
the Supreme Court of the United States. Frederick Schauer, Has Precedent Ever Really Mattered in the
Supreme Court?, 24 GA. ST. U. L. R EV. 381, 392 (2007). However, William A. Edmundson criticizes
Schauer as exaggerating the lack of impact. William A. Edmundson, Schauer on Precedent in the U.S.
Supreme Court, 24 GA. ST. U. L. R EV. 403 (2007). I tend to share the view of Professor Edmundson.
See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional
Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. R EV. 570 (2001); Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of
Precedents, 90 M INN . L. R EV. 1173 (2006). But see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Supreme
Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis Require Adherence to the Supreme Court’s Current
Doctrine of Stare Decisis?, 86 N.C. L. R EV. 1165 (2008) (arguing for the overruling of the current
doctrine of stare decisis). To what extent the Supreme Court should give respect to precedent is a
different matter. See generally Tom Hardy, Has Mighty Casey Struck Out?: Societal Reliance and the
Supreme Court’s Modern Stare Decisis Analysis, 34 HASTINGS C ONST . L.Q. 4 (2007) (supporting the
court’s consideration of societal reliance in considering whether to follow precedents); Randy J. Kozel,
Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 W ASH . & LEE L. R EV. 411 (2010) (proposing to reformulate
stare decisis by directly focusing on reliance interest).
66. I share a view that it is better to acknowledge that the precedents of the Supreme Court are
legally binding in Japan. SHIGENORI M ATSUI, N IHONKOKU KENPŌ [JAPANESE C ONSTITUTION ] 33
(3d ed. 2007). After all, respect for precedents is indispensable in any society that adheres to the rule
of law. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992). Moreover, it is
frequently suggested that the binding power of the constitutional precedents is not strong, even in the
United States. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405–07 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). There is no critical difference in the practical effect of the precedents between the United
States and Japan.

